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STUDENT NOTES
negligence so as to satisfy the requirements of the statute, altho he
was not guilty of gross negligence; and he was convicted of manslaughter. Altho the decision reaches the right result, it is apparent
that this distinction between "gross" and "culpable" negligence is
purely artificial and without basis. This case indicates the confusion
which has arisen through the use of these terms.
In Nail v. State,z an Oklahoma case, defendant was indicted for
manslaughter for allowing his automobile to hit and kill the deceased.
The Oklahoma statute specifies that negligence sufficient to impose
criminal liability must be culpable. The court in defining culpable
negligence said that it is "the want of that usual and ordinary care and
caution in the performance of an act usually and ordinarily exercised
Ample
by a person under similar circumstances and conditions".
6
authority can be found sustaining the correctness of this definition,
and it Is submitted that when the court instructs that negligence sufficient to impose criminal liability must be culpable, and then defines
culpable negligence as a lack of due care under all the circumstances,
It Is In effect laying down the tort standard of negligence. This seems
the best method of procedure when a statute specifies that negligence
must be culpable in order to supply the intent necessary for a criminal
conviction. However, in the absence of a statute to this effect it would
seem that the only effect of the words "culpable", "gross", or "criminal
negligence" in the instruction is to confuse the jury.
There is no question but that the decision in the principal case of
T
Banks v. State is correct and in line with the present tendency in
the criminal law of looking less to the intent with which an act is
committed and more to the consequences of that act.
BEaT COMas.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE CASES
"Criminal or culpable negligence, within the meaning of the law,
is the omission on the part of a person to do some act under given
circumstances which an ordinarily careful or prudent man would do
under like circumstances, or the doing of some act, under given circumstances, which an ordinarily careful, prudent man under like circumstances would not do, and by reason of which omission or action,
another person is endangered in life or bodily safety."'
In this case the owner of a small chili stand placed a gun on
33 Okla. Cr. 100, 242 Pac. 270 (1926).
282 Words and Phrases, p. 1780; Sikes v. Sheldon, 58 Iowa 744, 13
N. W. 53 (1882); State v. Emery, 78 Mo. 77, 47 Am. Rep. 92 (1883).
17 85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919), cited note 1, supra.
IState v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S. W. 817, 37 A. L. R. 1094
(1924).
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the counter, and tied a string to it in such a manner that the gun
went off and killed the deceased when he attempted to enter the
building. The defendant was found guilty of the crime of manslaughter, and appealed on the ground, among others, that this instruction
was erroneous. The supreme court affirmed the judgment. The Missouri statuteP said, "Every killing of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another, not herein declared to be
murder or excusable homicide or justifiable homicide, shall be deemed
manslaughter." No definition of the term "criminal negligence" Is
included in the statute; in the absence of such statutory definition, it
is submitted that the court erred in giving this instruction to the jury.
A majority of the courts hold there must be something more than
the lack of ordinary care to convict the defendant of manslaughter.
The rule is well stated in Wells v. State,' where the court said: "More
than mere negligence must be shown to convict of manslaughter
arising out of the operation of an automobile. A conviction can be
based only on culpable negligence, which may be defined as such gross
or criminal negligence as evinces a wanton or reckless and utter disregard of the safety and lives of others." It is further borne out in
the case of State v. Cope,5 "The degree of negligence necessary to support a prosecution for manslaughter is greater than is necessary to
support a civil action and an instruction in a prosecution based on the
negligent operation of an automobile, which lays down the test of negligence for civil liability is prejudicial error."
Admitting the majority rule requires something more than lack
of ordinary care in order to convict a defendant of the crime of manslaughter, it is the purpose of this paper to inquire into the reasoning
behind the doctrine and in some measure to answer those who would
contend that the standard of negligence used in a manslaughter case
should be the same as in a civil action.
In any discussion of a legal problem it is always advisable to inquire into previous decisions on the question. Such investigation serves
two purposes: first, to show the prevailing rule, and second, to disclose some logical justification for it. Here nothing need be said as
to what is the general rule. It is too well established to admit of any
doubt, although there is a minority line of cases. But what Is the
basis of it? Why have the courts consistently refused to hold the
defendant criminally liable when he has injured a person through the
lack of ordinary care? Perhaps the real answer to this question will
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) 3236.
State v. Clark, 196 Iowa 1134, 196 N. W. 82 (1923); People v.
Adams, 289 Ill. 339, 124 N. E. 575 (1919); People v. Barnes, 182 Mich.
179, 148 N. W. 400 (1914); People v. Schneider, 360 Ill. 43, 195 N. E.
430 (1935); Commonwealth v. Arone, 265 Mass. 128, 163 N. E. 758
(1928). See A. L. R. 829 for supplemental case authority.
Wells v. State, 16 Miss. 617, 139 So. 859 (1932).
"State v. Cope, 204 N. C. 28, 167 S. E. 456 (1933).
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be found by noting the difference between the purpose of a civil
action and that of a criminal prosecution. The purpose of the first is
to compensate the injured party, to restore him to status quo; while
the purpose of the second is to prevent crime and maintain order in
society through punishment of the offender. Thus the theories upon
which liability rests in the two cases are separate and distinct. The
problem resolves itself into this question, "Will accidents which have
been caused by ordinary negligence be prevented or deterred by making
the defndant criminally liable for such negligence?" If the rule is to
be changed, this question must be answered in the affirmative. There
is no need for a rule of law in which the defendant is punished
criminally, without being deterred. The deterrence provided must be
of such .value as to overbalance the hardship of punishment which
would be placed upon the defendant. Who knows whether or not the
proposed rule would have any such value? Any answer to this question would be supposititious. It is impossible to answer it from any
facts or statistics. There is no logical basis of reasoning which will
determine the answer, and thus it is only through observation and experience that any definite conclusion can be reached. In this connection It must be remembered that the established rule has come down
through the years, that human nature has changed but little in that
time, and that if the proposed rule would deter and prevent crime to
the degree some say it wduld, it would surely have been adopted before
now. Thus time and experience lead to the conclusion that, after all,
men are prone to be ordinarily negligent; it is their nature, and no
amount of criminal punishment will prevent such negligence.
If the tort standard of negligence were adopted, how would the
judge instruct the jury? Would he say, "Gentlemen of the jury, if you
find that the defendant has failed to use that care which an ordinarily
reasonable, prudent man would have used under the same or similar
circumstances, then you will find him guilty of manslaughter"? If so,
what kind of manslaughter would he have reference to? Manslaughter is governed by statutes which establish different degrees of it. If
this instruction were given to a jury, it could find the defendant
guilty of any one of the degrees, and thus the jury would be given
a wide discretion, which would undoubtedly place a hardship on the
defendant in many cases. To illustrate: A, who is an honest but
poor citizen, usually prudent and careful in his conduct, is driving
slowly down the street. He casually turns to wave to a friend who
Is passing by. While doing so, he loses sight of the road for a moment's
time, and in this Interval he hits a person and kills him. On the other
hand, B, who Is the son of a rich and influential business man, is
driving through a mid-town business section at a fast and reckless
rate of speed in total disregard to the safety of others. While so
driving, he runs over a person and kills him. Both of these men were
negligent. Both have been the direct cause of another's death. Yet,
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how can it be said that both are guilty of the same crime which, under
the proposed single standard, the jury might well find? There would
be no limit placed on the jury's discretion; ordinary negligence might
be made the basis of a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree.
If the rule were changed, what would be the practical result? The
already overcrowded courts would be burdened by another species of
crimes. The poorer class would suffer in that it could not pay the
fines imposed, and would have to serve a jail sentence. The economic
result would be bad. All this would be accomplished in trying to
realize the vain hope of deterring negligent acts and thus preventing
accidents.
It has been suggested that the ordinary negligence standard be
used in criminal cases with the added provision that the jury be
instructed that it is a criminal action when determining whether or
not the defendant has been guilty of ordinary negligence. Such a
technical rule would serve to confuse the jury until it would be almost
impossible for it to come to a sensible decision on the defendant's guilt
or Innocence. The present rule is much simpler and much more desirable. When a judge instructs the jury that something more than
ordinary negligence is necessary in a criminal action, something which
evinces a wanton and reckless disregard of life, there flashes into the
mind of the juror a mental picture in which the juror sees a person
committing a rash and reckless act. Such a picture aids him In determining whether or not the defendant has committed such an act
and thus enables him to come to a just decision.
The law must progress and expand to meet the needs of the times.
It is in the constant process of growth and rightly so, but the proposed extension of the negligence standard in civil cases to the field
of crime is a radical departure from the established rule, calculated to
be of slight preventive value, which, when compared to the hardship
and injustice placed upon the defendant, seems relatively small. In
such a situation it is submitted that, even though the present rule has
its faults, it should be retained until another and better one Is
suggested.
E. W. SALISBURY.

SOCIOLOGICAL EXPEDIENCY OF STERILIZATION STATUTE'
In Kentucky the marriage of an idiot or lunatic is declared void.'
We have no provision prohibiting the feeble-minded from marrying,
except that we penalize aiding or abetting the marriage of the feeble'In this note we are not considering the much controverted subject of sterilization for eugenical purposes, but only the sociological
aspect of sterilization.
sKy. Stat. (1929) Sec, 2097.

